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What Do You Mean, Rhetoric is Epistemic? 
Abstract 
 
 
 The thesis that rhetoric is epistemic has gained widespread acceptance and has 
influenced rhetorical theory. The thesis suggests that argumentative justification in 
rhetorical contexts is fundamentally epistemic. Unfortunately, however, much of the 
literature developing the thesis has employed vague or inconsistent definitions of key 
terms, resulting in theoretical errors and needless complications. This essay clarifies the 
definitions of “rhetoric,” “knowledge,” and “certainty,” showing how the notion that 
rhetoric is epistemic might be developed in a clearer and more useful way. 
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What Do You Mean, Rhetoric is Epistemic? 
 In 1967, Robert L. Scott advocated that “rhetoric is epistemic.”1 This concept has 
enriched the work of rhetorical theorists and critics. Scott‟s essay is founded in a concept 
of argumentative justification in rhetoric, viewed as an alternative to analytic logic. Other 
writers, including Brummett,
2
 Railsback,
3
 and Cherwitz and Hikins,
4
 have offered 
variations on Scott‟s theme. The thesis that rhetoric is epistemic has been controversial, 
however, and from the tone of the debate one may draw two conclusions: (1) many 
rhetorical theorists feel that Scott was on to something important and, (2) the thesis as it 
has been developed is flawed. Much of the dispute centers on what the thesis means. 
These discussions have not yet adequately clarified that issue. 
 The philosopher‟s most fundamental obligation is to define terms with care. It is 
in precisely this respect that the rhetoric-is-epistemic theorists have fallen short. Some of 
the key terms in this literature include “rhetoric,” “knowledge,” “certainty,” and “truth.” 
In too many cases, the writers on rhetorical epistemology have not defined their key 
terms at all. In other cases, their definitions are inadequate or inconsistent. This essay 
undertakes to sort out the most important definitional problems, which center on the 
rhetoric-is-epistemic theorists‟ habit of equivocating about the meanings of “rhetoric” 
and “certainty.” The result makes it possible to endorse the validity of Scott’s essentially 
ethical conclusions, while dismissing a number of unnecessary complexities in the 
arguments made by rhetoric-as-epistemic theorists. Finally, a few alternatives that might 
lead to more robust foundations for the rhetoric-as-epistemic thesis are suggested.   
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 In 1978, after reviewing four distinct interpretations of the claim that rhetoric is 
epistemic, Leff concluded that clarification of what that claim means “deserves more 
disciplined treatment than it has received in the recent literature.”5 The same could still 
be said. After some thirty years of active research and speculation on the topic, one now 
sees fewer publications specifically advocating that rhetoric is epistemic. The 
distinguished rhetorical theorist Barry Brummett has declared the thesis deceased.
6
  
All the same, textbook authors treat the thesis as a given, despite their tendency to 
interpret it in wildly different ways. Foss, for example, puts forward a view that “in the 
field of communication, the idea that rhetoric creates reality is known as the notion that 
rhetoric is epistemic, which simply means that rhetoric creates knowledge; epistemology 
is the study of the origin and nature of knowledge” (emphasis in the original).7 This 
version of the thesis, claiming that rhetoric actually “creates reality,” might be more 
ontological than it is epistemic.
8
 Herrick takes a dialectical view that “through rhetorical 
interaction, people come to accept some ideas as true and to reject others as false. Thus, 
rhetoric‟s epistemic function in society can be seen in some ways to be a result of its 
benefit of testing ideas.” Herrick continues that “once an idea has been tested thoroughly 
by a group, community, and society, it becomes part of what these groups take to be 
knowledge.”9 Herrick contrasts this with the rejected view that “knowledge is all 
objective in nature and comes to us by way of direct experience or education.”10 Both 
Herrick and Foss offer interesting theses, and both attribute their views to Scott, but their 
views are obviously very different. There can be no surer evidence of the failure to use 
terms precisely.  
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Brummett attributes the demise of rhetoric-is-epistemic research to the failure of 
critics to employ the idea in rhetorical criticism.
11
 Brummett might be right to the extent 
that much of the rhetoric-is-epistemic literature is indeed exceptionally abstract. Specific 
discussions might clarify some issues. Nonetheless, some notable rhetorical critics have 
indeed employed a concept that rhetoric is epistemic.
12
 The issues remain unclear. 
Furthermore, rhetorical criticism per se cannot clarify the meanings of theoretical terms. 
More likely, one sees less and less published research about the thesis that rhetoric is 
epistemic precisely because the thesis has not been laid out clearly enough.  
 On the one hand, rhetorical theorists sometimes lose patience with what they 
perceive to be the overly technical arguments of philosophers. On the other hand, much 
of what follows might strike a philosopher as rather straightforward, boilerplate 
philosophy. In that context, my only excuses for offering this essay are these: (1) in 
claiming that rhetoric is epistemic, rhetoricians have walked onto Plato‟s playground and 
must expect to play by Plato‟s rules (that Athenian always was a stickler for definitions), 
and, (2), if the rhetoric-is-epistemic thesis in its present forms succumbs easily to 
boilerplate philosophy, that cannot be a good sign.  
 This essay focuses on the positions laid out by Scott and by Cherwitz and Hikins, 
for these have been by far the most influential versions of the viewpoint. Scott deserves 
credit for introducing the thesis that rhetoric as epistemic.
13
 Scott proposed what was in 
1967 a new, radical way to understand rhetoric. It is in the nature of the first exposition of 
a new idea that the details may await clarification. Cherwitz and Hikins‟ work deserves 
attention not because they do an unusually poor job of offering definitions, but because 
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they have done by far the most thorough job of doing so. Their view differs from Scott‟s 
in important ways, but the definitional issues that they confront are very similar.  
“Certainty” 
 Scott‟s articles on viewing rhetoric as epistemic work from a perceived 
relationship between certainty and knowledge.
14
 This raises a host of definitional 
questions. First, what is certainty? Second, what is the definitional relationship between 
knowledge and certainty? Most of what Scott has to say, indeed, the heart of his 
argument, trades on an equivocation between two meanings of “certainty.” Furthermore, 
he seems to assume, without argument, that certainty is part of the traditional definition 
of knowledge. Let us take up the first issue first. 
 “Certainty” can be objective or subjective in its meaning.15 One might say, “It is 
certain that a Republican will be president in the year 2025.” This is a claim for objective 
certainty. One might instead state that “I feel certain that a Republican will be president 
in 2025,” which refers more to my state of mind than it does to who will actually be 
president. The first statement entails that a Republican will be president in 2025; the 
second does not. I am not making any claim about what things, if any, are objectively 
certain; I am just explaining two meanings that the word “certainty” has in everyday use.  
 It is easy to think of circumstances under which one can have either kind of 
certainty without the other. To illustrate: perhaps, a mathematical formula is certainly 
true (in the objective sense), even though no mathematician as yet has completed a proof 
and knows that it is certain. It is also possible to feel completely certain about something 
without its being true, or even plausible. I have myself felt completely certain about 
matters on which events eventually proved me wrong.
16
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Scott does not define “certainty,” nor does he choose between these two 
meanings. Instead, he seems to slide from a subjective sense of certainty to an objective 
sense of certainty. For example, during his key argument, Scott states that “the question 
may be posed, „What do you mean by certain?‟ To say, „I am certain that the sun will rise 
tomorrow,‟ may be to make a common statement which will probably not elicit 
argument, unless one is engaged in an epistemological discussion.”17 This represents a 
subjective sense of “certainty,” that is, that certainty is a state of mind. A few sentences 
later, however, Scott asserts that “the only sorts of arguments which will answer the 
demands of certainty made in epistemological speculation are those arguments which 
Toulmin calls analytic.”18 This clearly implies objective certainty, one for which ironclad 
(i.e., analytic) proof is supposedly adduced. The conclusion of the present essay suggests 
that subjective, not objective, certainty is central to Scott‟s theory. Nonetheless, Scott‟s 
argument is fundamentally against objective certainty. Scott‟s argument against the 
concept of certainty immediately short-circuits because it is founded on this equivocation.  
In a later essay, Scott writes that “When reason leads to certainties, people no 
longer have a reason to reason with one another, for surely those who lack certainty, lack 
reason.”19 This argument implies that people who believe that they have a right to be 
certain will treat others wrongly. Nonetheless, reason of extraordinary quality would, in 
principle, seem to lead to objective certainty, which is something else. So, Scott‟s real 
argument (freed from an ambiguous concept of certainty) should be something like, 
“People who have such confidence in their ability to reason that that cannot see the 
possibility of being in error, will no longer perceive a reason to reason with one 
another . . .” This is a worthwhile point, to which this essay will return. 
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 Furthermore, Scott‟s essay leads us to the critical question of defining knowledge. 
Is certainty, whether subjective or objective, part of his definition of knowledge? Is 
certainty essential to knowledge? Does Scott believe that traditional theories of 
knowledge require a concept of certainty, which can be evaded only by viewing rhetoric 
as epistemic?  
Ayer states that the conditions “for knowing that something is the case are first 
that what one is said to know be true, secondly that one be sure of it, and thirdly that one 
should have the right to be sure.”20 Therefore, for Ayer, one must feel subjectively certain 
that something is true for one to know it. However, Alston has argued convincingly that 
this kind of thinking represents a level confusion fallacy, in that for one to know 
something does not logically require that one is sure of it: for example, to say “Pat knows 
that p is true” means one thing, and “Pat knows that s/he knows that p is true” means 
something else. It is conceivable that I could know something without knowing that I 
know it, in which case I have knowledge, but might have no subjective sense of 
certainty.
21
 Fewer post-World War II philosophers, including the analytic philosophers 
against whom Scott‟s essay appears to be directed, seem to believe that certainty in either 
sense is a defining condition of knowledge. In any case, there has been a quite a lively 
debate on the question, and Scott assumes with little argument that epistemologists 
require that knowledge be certain in some sense or other.  
 Cherwitz and Hikins distinguish more carefully between the two meanings of 
“certainty,” but as their study progresses they, too, equivocate between the two.22 Like 
Scott, they seem to assume that some form of certainty, or near-certainty, is necessary for 
the traditional accounts of knowledge. However, they confuse the issue to the detriment 
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of their position: “we need next to deal with how one can become certain that he or she 
has attained knowledge on an issue. . . . we set the ultimate, human standard for certainty 
at the fullest humanly possible level of confidence in beliefs.” This plainly states that 
subjective certainty is a necessary condition for knowledge. Yet, a page later, one finds 
them talking about certainty as if it is based on justification: “Although we cannot say 
with certainty what precise level of justification any proposition must have, we are 
confident that in such cases [as in certain of their examples] the requisite level has been 
reached, and the propositions stand as knowledge”23 (emphasis in the original). Thus, 
they slide without an argument from a claim about feeling certain to one about being 
justified in being certain. This is a straightforward equivocation between the two 
meanings of certainty. 
 This is unfortunate for their theory, since viewing rhetoric as epistemic seemingly 
implies that there is a justificatory quality of some kind in rhetorical processes. Any 
argument for that claim short-circuits when it is founded on using a key term in more 
than one sense. It is, obviously, much easier to show that rhetoric can increase our feeling 
that we are certain (which, I think, Cherwitz and Hikins demonstrate throughout their 
book) than it is to show that it justifies our beliefs.  
“Rhetoric” 
 Well, of course, all rhetorical theories are about rhetoric, so one takes the meaning 
of the word “rhetoric” for granted. Furthermore, rhetoricians have long shown a fondness 
for poetic definitions, like defining rhetoric as “the rationale of informative and suasory 
discourse” (emphasis in the original).24 If we want to be clear, however, we need a more 
precise definition.  
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The root of “rhetoric” is “rhē-”, which in Greek signifies speech.25 To the ancient 
Greeks, rhetoric was public speaking. Socrates asked Gorgias to define what his art was, 
and Gorgias defined it first as the ability to convince one‟s listeners in the law courts and 
public assemblies, and then quickly agreed with Socrates that rhetoric is persuasion.
26
 
Over the centuries, and most particularly under the inspiration of Kenneth Burke, the 
study of rhetoric has come to include all persuasive communication, including written 
and nonverbal communication. According to Campbell, for example, “rhetoric is the 
study of what is persuasive.”27 An essay of which Scott is a co-author implies a similar 
point, claiming that “the point made by Scott‟s and Farrell‟s writings is that the practice 
of rhetoric is epistemic (i.e., knowledge-producing) because we must be persuaded of our 
beliefs.”28  
When theorists say that rhetoric is epistemic, do they mean that persuasion has an 
epistemic quality? Do they mean to distinguish communication that is persuasive, or will 
they allow any communication to count as rhetoric? How broad, or how narrow, a 
conception of rhetoric is necessary in order to make sense of the claim that rhetoric is 
epistemic? 
Many rhetoric-is-epistemic theorists operate with a very broad definition of 
rhetoric. This is troublesome. It might be hard to establish a significant epistemic role for 
set-piece persuasive speeches, but much easier to establish an epistemic role for rhetoric 
if rhetoric is conceived more largely. In a 1973 article, Scott suggests that any definition 
of rhetoric will be inadequate.
29
 In a 2000 essay, Scott offers the definition that “Rhetoric 
is the possibility of bringing reason together with passion so that in action humans may 
civilize themselves.”30 This is interesting, although it fits into the category of poetic 
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definitions. Cherwitz and Hikins, noting the importance of avoiding ambiguity, define 
rhetoric as “description of reality through language” (emphasis in the original).31 This 
expansive definition facilitates their argument that rhetoric is epistemic, for some 
epistemic function can surely be found for describing reality through language. As long 
as they work with this definition, they do not need to establish that persuasive 
communication is epistemic, for example, which would be a more difficult task.
32
 
Railsback‟s approach to seeing rhetoric as epistemic also works with a very broad 
conception of rhetoric: “Rhetoric thus mediates the relationship between language and 
external material conditions.” She implies both persuasive and non-persuasive aspects for 
rhetoric.
33
  
However, the broader the definition of rhetoric, the less interesting the claim that 
rhetoric is epistemic becomes.
34
 If I could provide evidence that public speaking is 
fundamentally epistemic, this would be controversial, even implausible, but interesting. 
To claim that persuasive communication is epistemic would be nearly as interesting, and, 
if there is anything worthwhile to the claim that rhetoric is epistemic, this would, in my 
opinion, be the definition of rhetoric to use. If, however, one claims that rhetoric includes 
all language use, then all one has to prove to establish that rhetoric is epistemic is that 
language has an epistemic function. This could still be controversial (one question that 
ought to come up is whether a small child who lacks language also lacks the ability to 
know), yet it is an inherently less interesting claim. If one can by definition substitute the 
term “language use” for “rhetoric,” if all that a rhetoric-as-epistemic theorist means is 
that language use has an epistemic function, it is difficult to understand what the big fuss 
is about. The claim is too nearly obvious, too mundane, to justify so much study of the 
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topic. To say that “rhetoric” means “describing reality through language” is still a very 
broad definition of rhetoric. (It is also a technical use of the word “rhetoric,” one not well 
supported by everyday use of the term by educated, reflective non-specialists. Many uses 
of language to describe reality do not strike me as especially rhetorical, e.g., the rhetorical 
aspects of “Your telephone is ringing,” “There are dandelions in my lawn,” or “Yow, I hit 
my thumb” seem to me to be relatively unimportant.) In order for the claim that rhetoric 
is epistemic to be clear, one would hope for a definition that is specific enough to yield a 
discussion that makes worthwhile claims.  
The Gettier Problem 
Rhetoric-is-epistemic theories seem to assume that knowledge must be justified 
belief, and that the justification can, should, or must be rhetorical. Cherwitz and Hikins, 
for example, define knowledge as requiring “(1) truth, (2) belief, and (3) justification.” 
They cite, among others, a statement of Butchvarov that “equates knowledge with „true 
belief based on sufficient evidence.‟”35  
Other rhetoric-is-epistemic theorists are not so careful to define knowledge, but 
they often seem to operate with an implied conception that knowledge is justified true 
belief. A basic idea behind viewing rhetoric as epistemic is to argue that justification has 
a rhetorical element. Scott, for example, repeatedly discusses issues of justification. 
Similarly, Railsback states that “consensus must be used as our primary indicator of the 
most true characterizations of the time.” She continues that “Consensus arises from the 
processes of inquiry and persuasion, and serves as the basis for future inquiry.”36 If 
justification is not a defining quality of knowledge, that entire approach never gets 
started. 
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Lurking behind this is a problem posed in one of the most influential short essays 
ever published in a philosophy journal, Edmund Gettier‟s “Is Justified True Belief 
Knowledge?”37 A by-product of Gettier‟s argument is to question the assumptions behind 
many of the familiar conceptions of rhetoric as epistemic. The traditional definitions of 
knowledge typically take the form that a person X knows something p if X believes p, if 
p is true, and if X is justified in believing p with a justification of sufficient rigor. Plato 
appears to endorse such a definition in the Theaetetus.
38
 Ayer‟s definition quoted above 
also falls into this category. Since rhetoric-is-epistemic theorists are exploring the 
relationship between knowledge and rhetorical justification, their theories tend to be 
steeped in a similar conception of knowledge. Gettier argues that the traditional 
definitions fail because they do not constitute sufficient conditions for knowing 
something. Because of Gettier‟s argument, the conceptual relationship between 
knowledge and justification seems to be extremely problematic. 
 Gettier assumes, first, that it is possible to be justified in believing something that 
is not true. Second, Gettier assumes that if one is justified in believing one proposition, 
and then deduces a second proposition from the first, that one is justified in believing the 
second proposition. There seems to be no reason that rhetoricians should object to either 
of these assumptions. 
 Consider the following Gettier-type example. A political speaker sees that an 
election‟s results have been posted, and that the election officials have declared that 
candidate Jill Smith has received 2,220 votes, and that candidate Harry Early has 
received only 889 votes. The election officials have always been reliable in the past. The 
speaker concludes that Smith is the winner and, indeed, so announces in a speech. 
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Unfortunately, unknown to the speaker, the election officials had, by mistake, counted the 
ballots from a different jurisdiction entirely. (If a jurisdiction uses the punch-card ballots 
that were popular in the United States as of this writing, which contain little written 
information, such a slip-up could happen.) When the right ballots are obtained a few days 
later, it turns out that Smith received 2,001 votes, and that Early received 720 votes.  
 The speaker‟s belief that Smith won the election was true. It was also justified. 
Nonetheless, the speaker did not know that Smith was the winner. Only by chance was 
the speaker‟s belief true. Because of problems such as this, Gettier concludes that a belief 
can be true and justified, and yet not be knowledge.  
 Gettier‟s article has inspired a prodigious literature. At first glance, it seems that it 
should be easy to add a fourth condition of knowledge to the traditional definition that 
would rule out such accidental cases of justified true belief. Unfortunately, to this date, 
no such fourth condition has earned general acceptance. All of the proposed fourth 
conditions (one of which is mentioned by Cherwitz and Hikins; see below) have been 
refuted, usually rather easily, by various counterexamples.  
A second solution to the Gettier problem is to require that knowledge be based 
entirely on true premises.
39
 As Lehrer has pointed out, this very rigid condition would 
rule out much of what we would like to say we know.
40
 An example of this might be the 
following: a lawyer argues that her client, Mr. Jenkins, is innocent of murder. Her client 
has an excellent alibi, and the client‟s fingerprints do not match those of the murderer. 
She so pleads to a jury. She and the jury both conclude that Mr. Jenkins is innocent. Mr. 
Jenkins actually is completely innocent; however, his alibi later turns out to have been 
based on mistaken identity. Nonetheless, the fingerprints still provide excellent proof of 
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his innocence. I would like to be able to say that the lawyer and jury know that Mr. 
Jenkins is innocent, but if I require that knowledge be based entirely on true premises, I 
cannot. Any attempt to make knowledge as strict as that seems unsettling, since requiring 
that all of the premises for a knowledge claim must be true rules out so much. One cannot 
easily imagine conducting a debate about a public policy issue, for example, if one is held 
to so unrealistically high a standard for one‟s knowledge claims. Furthermore, such an 
approach would defeat one of Scott‟s original purposes, which was to free knowledge 
from unreasonable standards.  
A third solution to the Gettier problem, proposed by Butchvarov, is to require that 
all justification for knowledge be ironclad, to eliminate all possibility of mistake.
41
 
However, surely no rhetorical theorist would wish to define knowledge in such rigorous 
terms that very few beliefs can qualify as knowledge.
42
  
Gettier‟s objection vitiates Cherwitz and Hikins‟ theory, since they explicitly 
trade on the definition of knowledge as justified true belief. Referring to Gettier‟s 
argument, Cherwitz and Hikins cite Lehrer‟s repair as preserving “the three criteria 
largely intact.”43 This seems doubtful. Lehrer‟s definition of knowledge in the cited 
reference is as follows: “in addition to having a completely justified true belief that P, the 
following fourth condition must be satisfied when a man knows that P: for any false 
statement F, X would be able to completely justify his belief that P even if he were to 
suppose, for the sake of argument, that F is false.”44 It is difficult to grasp how this 
complex repair retains “the three criteria largely intact.”  
Furthermore, Lehrer‟s fourth condition succumbs to arguments of the “barn 
county” family, which deal with beliefs that are founded on a pattern of deception.45 
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Suppose that I go to the bank, where I have done business for years, to check on the 
balance of my savings account. The bank and the tellers have always been flawlessly 
accurate. Today, however, the teller is planning an embezzlement scheme and is lying to 
her customers about their balances to further her criminal plan. My own account contains 
only $45.98, not enough for her to bother embezzling, so she tells me, alone among all of 
her customers, the truth. Based on her statement, I truly believe that my account has 
$45.98, and my belief is justified, but I do not know that my balance is $45.98 because 
this is true only by accident. Yet, my belief rests on no false statements and therefore 
satisfies Lehrer‟s tests. Therefore, even Lehrer‟s complex repair does not salvage the 
conception of knowledge as justified true belief.  
Early in their study, Cherwitz and Hikins argue that justification must be both 
“relevant” and “sufficient.”46 Near the end of their study, however, they argue that the 
justification must be based on “sufficient evidence to guarantee that knowledge has been 
attained with the fullest humanly possible certainty.”47 This is not enough to counter 
Gettier‟s problem, since the “fullest humanly possible certainty” does not eliminate the 
chance of error. If they intend to require ironclad (“sufficient”) justification to lie behind 
a belief in order for it to count as knowledge, then they would encounter the objections to 
that thesis discussed above. Actually, in either case, they come close enough that their 
definition restricts the realm of human knowledge considerably. Cherwitz‟ and Hikins‟ 
definition is thus not strong enough to avoid Gettier problems, but it is, unfortunately, 
strong enough to rule out many of our everyday claims to knowledge.  
Interestingly, Railsback claims to perceive a trend in the rhetoric-is-epistemic 
literature to move away “from the philosophical definition of knowledge as „justified true 
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belief‟ to a formulation which indicates that truth itself is „warranted assertability.‟” She 
cites to this effect a 1977 essay by McKerrow, which she holds to be compatible with her 
own view, which is based on the “bounded network theory of language.” 48 In the cited 
essay, McKerrow argues that an argument is valid “if, and only if, it serves as a 
pragmatic justification for the adoption of a belief.”49 Now, on Railsback‟s account, 
Gettier problems (or worse) would be hard to avoid, since McKerrow clearly states that 
warranted assertability does not require ironclad justification. Indeed, McKerrow 
distinguishes that “arguments justify rather than verify their claims” (emphasis in the 
original).
50
 Since “verify” by definition means to discover that something is true, there is 
clearly something here other than a claim that rhetoric is epistemic.  
Although McKerrow discusses “rhetorical validity” as justification, he does not 
claim in the 1977 essay that a rhetorically valid argument produces either knowledge or 
truth. Thus, McKerrow does not try to define knowledge rhetorically; he is instead 
defining validity. He carefully avoids any claim that rhetorical arguments entail truth, and 
thus avoids the Gettier problem entirely. Such a decoupling of justification from truth and 
knowledge may in fact be the most practical solution to the Gettier problem. This essay‟s 
conclusion returns to such a theme.  
Clarifying the Definitions 
It is not clear that the thesis that rhetoric is epistemic is dead, although it most 
certainly has not been adequately formulated. Fixing the definitions can lead to a great 
deal of progress.  
First, for the reasons above, rhetoric must be defined narrowly enough to produce 
an interesting discussion. One of the oldest and most common definitions of rhetoric is 
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“the art of persuasion.” Such a definition can lead to an interesting discussion. Defining 
rhetoric more broadly simply legislates an epistemic role for rhetoric by fiat; such an 
approach lacks interest. The question of significance to rhetorical theory is whether 
persuasion has an epistemic role, and that is the question that theorists should investigate. 
Second, the discussion should dispense with the issue of certainty. The current 
philosophical literature presents no reason that subjective certainty is a necessary 
component of knowledge. Furthermore, rhetoricians in a line reaching long before Scott‟s 
time have never shown any inclination to require objective certainty. Rhetoricians 
obviously do not want to maintain that rhetoric is a source of knowledge, and then claim 
that the matters about which people engage in rhetoric are unknowable. The current 
philosophical literature has not taken a strong stance in favor of requiring knowledge to 
be either objectively or subjectively certain, so the issue may (through no fault of Scott‟s, 
who wrote in 1967) have become a red herring.  
Two Ideas for a Rhetorical Epistemology 
It might be useful to sketch out a few different routes that rhetorical theorists 
could choose while defining terms carefully.  
There may be no need to examine the epistemological question at all. Scott‟s 
insight may be, for the most part, ethical and personal. Nonetheless, many rhetorical 
theorists find the idea that rhetoric is epistemic intriguing. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
sympathize with Brummett‟s pronouncement that the thesis that rhetoric is epistemic is 
dead. This essay will briefly suggest two avenues that rhetorical theorists could follow. 
Either of these approaches would make it possible to discuss how rhetoric is epistemic 
without encountering Gettier problems or relying on unclear conceptions of certainty. 
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One route that rhetoric-as-epistemic theorists could take is to adopt Alston‟s view 
that, in the normal course of life, our beliefs are justified if formed by our normal 
doxastic; i.e., belief-producing, practices. Alston does not imply an analytic connection 
between knowledge and justification. He simply argues that there is a presumption in 
favor of the normal ways in which we come to learn and believe things. Alston has a 
sense of community in mind, as he does not claim that any one individual‟s doxastic 
practices are necessarily reasonable. Rather, his point is that there is a presumption in 
favor of accepted doxastic practices.
51
  
Alston‟s view is amenable to what rhetoric-is-epistemic theorists have in mind. 
Indeed, there is an obvious relationship between Alston‟s suggestion and Scott‟s stress on 
the epistemic function of communities.
52
 Furthermore, a good case might be made that 
rhetoric is part of our normal doxastic practice. In addition, since rhetoricians since the 
time of Aristotle have held that rhetoric typically establishes claims that are probable, not 
necessarily true, Alston‟s position should intrigue rhetoricians. For example, Cyphert‟s 
view that rhetoric-as-epistemic practices are culturally variable and community-based 
could be further developed with reference to Alston‟s argument.53  
Alston‟s line of reasoning is not strictly speaking epistemic, for he is not claiming 
that our doxastic practices always produce knowledge. However, if our normal doxastic 
practices are worth anything, it is good to form our beliefs in accordance with them. 
Following Alston‟s lead, rhetorical theorists would explicate how rhetoric is part of our 
doxastic practice, but they would sever this explanation from the definitions of 
knowledge and certainty. This would greatly simplify our thinking about these issues. 
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McKerrow‟s 1977 argument, discussed above, already seems to be moving in a similar 
direction.  
A second avenue worthy of consideration by rhetorical theorists is the causal 
theory of knowing. This theory maintains, in essence, that I know that p if my belief that 
p was formed as the result of a reliable causal process. This, for starters, divests 
epistemology of the concept of justification, and thus avoids Gettier problems. Many 
epistemologists over the years have, in any case, argued that it is possible to know 
something even if one cannot offer a justification for it. That is, it is one thing to know 
that p, but something else entirely to be able to justify a belief that p. A cocker spaniel 
might know that it is time for a walk, but be unable to offer any justification.
54
  
A causal theory eliminates this awkward bump. One might think at first that this 
leaves little room for a rhetorician. For example, the idea behind McKerrow‟s notion of 
warranted assertability is to offer justification for one‟s claims. Nonetheless, presenting 
or receiving persuasive discourse might be a way of coming to know things, and so this 
theory does make it possible for rhetoric to be epistemic. Rhetoric-as-epistemic theorists 
would have plenty of room to discuss the reliability of the various argumentative and 
suasory devices that rhetoricians employ and to discuss when rhetoric does and does not 
reliably contribute to knowledge. A causal theory might yield interesting conclusions 
about value-laden, tradition-bound epideictic rhetoric, for example. What causes us to 
have beliefs about value issues? Are whatever processes that produce value-laden beliefs 
reliable? A causal theory seems to be incompatible with, for example, McKerrow‟s 
theory, but could yield interesting insights in other directions.  
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Railsback‟s explanation of the use of rhetoric as a means of use of rhetoric as a 
means of creating knowledge is probably as much ontological as it is epistemic: 
“Rhetoric is thus a creator of what is known by humankind, both technical and social 
knowledge.”55 Creation is a causal process, however, and discussing causal process issues 
in depth might fill out theories of the category that she describes.  
Epistemology, Ethics, or Both? 
Looking toward a more precise understanding of what it means to say that 
rhetoric is epistemic, one other question arises. Can rhetoricians accomplish their 
purposes without analyzing and disputing concepts of knowledge, truth, and certainty at 
all? One might not call such an approach epistemic, but it might address the important 
problems that Scott raises. Much of the appeal of Scott‟s essays, one suspects, is due to 
the fundamentally ethical stance that he advocates for rhetorical discourse. Scott intends 
his 1967 essay to be a refutation of “the assumption . . . that men can possess truth.”56 
However, why does he make such a contention? His primary purpose was never to solve 
abstruse epistemological problems. Instead, Scott testifies that “uncertainty demands 
toleration.”57 He continues that: “one who acts without certainty must embrace the 
responsibility for making his acts the best possible.”58 Indeed, in 1976, Scott pointed out 
the “basically ethical thrust” of his 1967 article.59 In 1990, he states that “I do not value 
the label „epistemic‟ highly. Let it pass.”60 He argues for tolerance and pluralism, and 
against dogmatism. He is probably right. He pleads that a rhetorical epistemology will 
achieve these ends. Maybe so.  
One suspects, indeed, that “knowledge” is not really at issue in a fundamental 
way in any of Scott‟s papers. Nor is objective certainty, which would be nice to have if it 
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turns out to be possible for us ignorant travelers to the grave to get it on rare occasions. 
Scott‟s real purpose is to complain against subjective certainty.61 He argues that people 
falsely claim certainty when they are not entitled to do so. He points out, correctly, that 
people are rarely, if ever, entitled to claim exclusive, immutable knowledge of truth. He 
recognizes the contingent, value-laden quality of rhetorical discourse. He celebrates this 
as a good thing to have in our uncertain universe. In a later essay, Scott states: “Many of 
our human failings in becoming and remaining civilized grow out of the false 
consciousness of certainty.”62 This hits the nail right on the head, and no objection can be 
raised to this fundamental claim.  
Thus, once one cuts through the terminological problems, equivocations, and red 
herrings that have troubled this literature over the years, one realizes that Scott indeed is, 
and has been, onto something. The general feeling of rhetoricians that Scott‟s theory is 
important is fully justified. The mistake is to think that it is necessary to quarrel with the 
concepts of knowledge, truth, or objective certainty in order to achieve such ethical ends. 
Scott‟s claim could best be established by presenting evidence of the fallibility of the 
human mind. That people need to engage in rhetoric despite being fallible might lead us 
to suspect that rhetoric is doxastic, but there is no need—as far as the ethical argument 
goes—to establish that it is epistemic. 
Aristotle wrote that rhetoric is the counterpart or contrary of dialectic.
63
 Rhetoric 
and dialectic do not contradict; rhetoric advocates and dialectic investigates. Dialectic, 
however, is in part a communicative process, a matter of give and take. Cicero felt that 
Plato‟s dialogues left nothing proven for sure; Plato‟s disputants argued both sides of the 
issue.
64
 Sloane discusses the practice of rhetoricians—and dialecticians too, of course, of 
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arguing both sides of an issue.
65
  “If dialectic‟s function is to find a probably truth 
through formal validity,” Sloane summarizes, “the function of rhetoric is to discern the 
available means of persuading people.” In both, Sloane continues, “the ends are achieved 
by indifferently setting up equally probably arguments pro and con.”66 This does not 
make rhetoric an alternative to epistemology, but its counterpart, more or less in 
Aristotle‟s sense. People interact to come to mutual or opposite understandings of truth as 
best they can. Thus, rhetoric may help us to understand how people examine their 
subjective uncertainty, and Scott‟s approach could be vindicated.  
However, scholars may wish to continue to investigate rhetoric as epistemic, and 
their investigations may bring considerable insights into rhetoric and epistemology alike. 
This inquiry must, however, define terms more carefully and consistently. To explore the 
relationship between rhetoric and knowledge, an analysis along one of the lines of inquiry 
suggested in this essay will be, one hopes, more precise and less, well, mystical, than 
many of those that have been circulating in the literature. Alternatively, an ethical focus 
could develop Scott‟s issues without bringing up the issue of objective certainty. It would 
be a mistake to accept the rhetoric-as-epistemic literature in its present form, but might be 
an even worse mistake to abandon Scott‟s insights entirely.  
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